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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to investigate the usefulness of analysts’ recommendations on firms listed on the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). It contradicts the majority of published works which conclude that 
analysts’ recommendations do offer valuable investment opportunities. The unique feature of this 
work is that it sheds light on the issue, adopting a practical approach stemming from the investor’s 
point of view. It is shown through an event study methodology, that analysts’ recommendations do 
not result to any significant excess returns. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n recent years major brokerage houses, spend substantial amounts of resources and time, on fundamental 
and technical analysis of listed firms. Moreover, based on this analysis, they attempt to extrapolate and 
predict the future, so as to provide their customers with sound advice and contribute towards, improving 
investors‟ portfolio returns. It is often the case that this advice assumes the form of analysts‟ recommendations, which 
are published through the media (newspapers, and electronic media). The issue under investigation then is, if analysts‟ 
recommendations publicly made available, do actually benefit investors by creating significant excess returns. 
 
Academic theory is clearly at odds regarding this issue. More specifically, under the joint hypothesis that a 
market is efficient and CAPM holds, the only priced factor is systematic risk. Therefore, analysts‟ recommendations, 
as well as other kinds of information do not add any value to diversified portfolios. However, a large number of 
empirical studies have questioned the validity of the above joint hypothesis, depicting that firm size, (Glezakos, M. 
and Mylonas P.,2003) and historical earnings yield (Glezakos, M.1995),  seriously affect stock returns.  Regarding the 
analysts‟ recommendations, many researchers who tried to investigate the issue seem to agree at least on one aspect, 
that the financial analysts are capable of pinpointing the undervalued and the overvalued stocks. 
 
Overall, analysts‟ recommendations take into account a number of parameters, which include real factors 
related to firm performance   as well as market conditions. Therefore, investigating   the effectiveness of analysts‟ 
recommendations represents a more powerful test of the validity of the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, than the corresponding traditional tests, which focus solely on corporate events. However, it must be 
stressed out that an investment strategy, based on analysts‟ recommendations, would carry with it, a substantial 
transaction cost. As a result, the net benefit might be zero. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Investigating the usefulness of analysts‟ recommendations has been the focus of research interest for many 
scholars. An overview of their findings suggests that as a general consensus, the analysts deal with the stocks of 
financially sound firms. Contributing to this is the fact, that during the last 10-15 years, huge funds have been 
concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, who basically invest in large and profitable companies. That is 
why, the positive recommendations by analysts are a multiple of the negative ones. An additional factor is that many 
analysts follow stocks that have attracted the interest of the institutional investors. So they make recommendations 
when the stock prices are already high enough. In those cases, it is apparent that recommendations have limited value 
for the investors. 
I 
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An extensive literature review on the issue, shed light to the following findings. Positive abnormal returns, 
due to the analysts‟ recommendations, were found by Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Groth et al (1979) and Bjering 
et al (1983). Also, Holloway (1981 and 1983), concluded that Value Line rankings were valuable, given that rank 1 
stocks outperformed the market, even after the deduction of transaction costs. Liu,Smith and Syed(1990), focused on 
the Wall Street Journal study, and discovered that the information shown under the column „Heard on the Street‟ lead 
to substantial returns of the order of 3.5% in the month following. By the same token, Barber and Loefler (1993), who 
analyzed the information under the column „Dartboard‟, were able to show excess returns of the order of 4%. Stickel 
(1995) and Womack (1996), focusing on the changes in the analysts‟ recommendations, concluded that they do offer 
profitable investment opportunities. 
 
The Wall Street Journal evaluated the effectiveness of analysts‟ recommendations, comparing the results 
with those of a group of stocks selected at random (dartboard portfolio) and also with the Dow Jones. The outcome 
from this comparative study was that the analysts‟ perform slightly better, if one does not take into account dividends 
and investors‟ risk (Walker and Hatfield, 1996). 
 
Barber, Lehany McNichols and Trueman (2001), utilizing data from Zack‟s data base, found an excess return 
of 4% for stocks which attracted a “strong buy” recommendation. Narashiman et al (2004), deriving data from the 
same data-base, conclude that only changes in the analysts‟ recommendations are associated with substantial abnormal 
returns. On the other hand, Copeland and Myers (1982), utilizing data from Value Line, reached the reverse 
conclusion. Similarly, Walker and Hatfield (1996), concluded that individual investors experience inferior 
performance by following analysts‟ recommendations published in the “Market Highlights” of “USA Today”. 
However, it must be pointed out that most studies with positive results, do not consider transaction costs, which are 
substantial, mainly because all methodologies which lead to excess returns assume daily rebalancement of the formed 
portfolios. Overall, the majority of evidence up to date shows that analysts‟ recommendations lead to abnormal 
returns, which are not maintained if transaction costs are taken into account. Furthermore, even though analysts can 
pinpoint overvalued and undervalued shares, it is only for short-term investor horizon. 
 
THE SAMPLE 
 
This study gathered information from the daily electronic press, where there is free access without any cost 
or delay. The most widely accessed sites both by brokerage firms as well as investors, were selected.  Similar studies, 
used newspaper information like „USA Today‟ and „Wall Street Journal‟ in Barber and Loefler (1993), Lieu, Smith 
and Syed (1993), Holloway (1981 and 1983), Walker and Hatfield (1996) etc. Recent works derived information from 
„Zacks Investment Research‟, which includes a large number of recommendations (over 400,000) since 1985. 
Unfortunately, for Greece there is no provision of a similar service due to the late development of the stock exchange 
mainly over the last 7-8 years. In total we‟ve been able to gather 727 recommendations over the period 1/8/2004-
31/7/2005. Over the chosen period, the General Index experienced a substantial rise of over 30%.Out of the 727 
recommendations, 66 were merged because they referred to cases where different analysts recommended the same 
stock, the same day. So, 661 recommendations are included in the present study, which is a pretty good figure in the 
context of the relevant literature. 
 
Recommendations for I.P.O.‟s were not included, given that investors usually treat them as underpriced, at 
least in the first trading days (Glezakos and Gotzageorgis,2005). The standard methodology of scholars, when 
investigating analysts‟ recommendations is to group them into 5 categories, which cover the whole spectrum from a 
„strong buy‟ recommendation up to a „strong sell‟. More specifically, the five categories are: 1) Strong Buy, 2) Buy, 
3)Hold, 4)Sell and 5)Strong Sell. The recommendations we collected, are not classified according to the categories 
above, instead they specify a target price. For example, the current price of a share is €4,5 and a €6 target price is 
announced. So what we have done, in order to convert to the classification of the literature, is to define deviations 
from the current price, and classify the deviations accordingly. Therefore, for a 20% higher target price, from the 
current, the recommendation is classified as strong buy, group 1. If the deviation is between 10%-20%, the 
recommendation is buy and classified in group 2. Similarly, group 3, contains recommendations with deviations 
between 0%-10%, group 4 contains recommendations with negative deviations between 0%-10% and group 5 
contains recommendations with negative deviations greater than 10%. It is not rare that, modifications like the above 
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occur. For example, „Zacks Investment Research‟, converts the analyst‟s rating, independently of the scale used,  to its 
five- point scale. 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution Of Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
Company/ Share 
No. of 
Recommendations 
per Company 
No. of Recommendations per 
Category 
No. of 
Brokerage 
Houses that 
Recommended 
the Company 1 2 3 4 5 
3E 28 5 10 11 1 1 15 
ALPHA BANK 32 11 11 9 1 0 12 
ATTICA GROUP 5 4 1 0 0 0 3 
AUTOHELLAS 4 4 0 0 0 0 3 
CARDICO 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
CHIPITA 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 
COSMOTE 31 1 17 12 1 0 17 
CROWN HELLAS 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
ELMEC 5 3 1 1 0 0 3 
EUROBANK 24 3 11 7 3 0 11 
EUROMEDICA 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
FOLLI 26 12 9 5 0 0 9 
FOURLIS 9 1 5 2 1 0 6 
FRIGOGLASS 9 6 2 1 0 0 4 
HYATT 12 3 5 4 0 0 9 
IMAKO 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 
INFORM LYKOS 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
INTRACOM 7 1 3 3 0 0 5 
INTRALOT 29 9 2 10 6 2 10 
JUMBO 13 3 8 2 0 0 6 
GERMANOS 32 6 14 11 1 0 13 
DEH 32 8 14 8 0 2 14 
DELTA SYMETOHON 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
NATIONAL BANK 45 9 27 9 0 0 16 
HEL. PETROL. 7 0 5 2 0 0 4 
HEL. ΤΕHNOD. 7 7 0 0 0 0 4 
COMMERCIAL BANK. 11 1 1 3 1 5 7 
ΕHΑΕ 12 0 2 8 2 0 7 
ATHENS ELECTRONIKI 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 
ΜΑILLIS 20 13 4 2 1 0 9 
ΜΑΡΑΚ 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 
ΜΕΤΚΑ 8 3 4 1 0 0 6 
ΜΙΝOIKES 4 2 1 0 1 0 3 
ΜΟHLΟΣ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
ΜIΤΙLIΝΑΙΟS 8 7 1 0 0 0 6 
ΝΕΟHIΜΙΚI 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
ΝΙΚΑS 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
ΟPΑP 26 1 8 12 5 0 14 
PΕΤΖΕΤΑΚΙS 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 
PLΑΙSΙΟ 8 3 5 0 0 0 5 
ΚΑΕ 24 5 12 7 0 0 12 
KLEEMAN 4 1 2 1 0 0 3 
MOTOR OIL 15 0 9 6 0 0 6 
NOTOS COM 11 11 0 0 0 0 4 
OTE 48 5 16 18 9 0 16 
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S & B 5 4 0 1 0 0 3 
SPRIDER 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 
JP ΑVΑX 4 4 0 0 0 0 2 
ΑΚΤOR 4 4 0 0 0 0 3 
ΑLUΜΙΝΙΟ 3 1 0 0 2 0 3 
RΟΚΑS 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
SΑRΑΝΤIS 9 1 4 2 2 0 5 
ΤΕGΟPOULOS 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
ΤΕRΝΑ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
ΤΕHΝΙΚI ΟLΥΜPΙΑΚI 3 1 0 2 0 0 2 
ΤILΕΤIPΟS 6 0 1 2 2 1 4 
ΤΙΤΑΝ 29 3 12 9 2 3 12 
ΑΤΤΙΚA  BANK 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
PΙRAEUS BANK 13 6 0 4 2 1 6 
HΑΤΖIOΑΝΝU 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total No. of 
Recommendations 
661 194 231 178 43 15  
 
 
  As it appears from Table 1, the 661 recommendations refer to 60 firms, a number which is approximately one 
sixth of the total number of companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. It does represent though 75% of their 
total market value. Our sample, confirms what is already known from the literature, that financial analysts are mainly 
interested in large firms, because they meet the criteria and reduce the risk of false prediction. 
 
  The analysts‟ recommendations in our sample came from 28 different brokerage houses, out of which 17 
focused on the telecommunications company (COSMOTE), while for OTE, there were 48 recommendations made 
within the twelve month period under investigation, on average four recommendations a month. It is rather impressive 
that 91% of the recommendations were positive and only 9% were negative. In categories 1 and 5 the percentages 
were 29.3% and 2.3% respectively. Also with respect to some companies, we observe that they have been through the 
whole spectrum within the period under consideration, from 1 up to 5. The eagerness of analysts to recommend 
positively becomes apparent from Table 2, which presents the repetitions of the initial recommendation as well as its 
variation. 
 
 
Table 2: Shift Of Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
 To Recommendation of : 
From Recommendation of : 1 2 3 4 5 
1 15,1% 7,6% 4,1% 1,0% 0,3% 
2 5,9% 14,0% 12,5% 1,1% 0,3% 
3 4,4% 10,0% 8,2% 2,8% 2,0% 
4 0,8% 1,6% 2,8% 2,0% 0,2% 
5 0,3% 0,5% 0,5% 1,5% 0,5% 
 26,6% 33,7% 28,1% 8,4% 3,3% 
 
 
 More specifically, in 39.7% of the cases the analysts repeated the same recommendation, in 44.5% they 
repeated a positive recommendation and in 4.1% they repeated a negative recommendation. Finally, only 7.6% of 
recommendations changed from positive to negative and 6.6% from negative to positive. The findings above coincide 
with those of Barber, Lehany, McNichols and Trueman (2001), for NYSE and AMEX and confirm the eagerness of 
the analysts to recommend positively. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
We focused on the influence of analysts recommendations on stock returns and employed an event study 
methodology. After the big stock exchange rise and fall of 1999, the majority of Greek investors, as evidence suggests 
from the official data of the Stock Market Clearing House, developed a profile with distinct, well defined 
characteristics. On the basis of these characteristics and through an extensive empirical research over the last six 
years1,through questionnaires, personal interviews and secondary data kept by the Athens Stock Exchange Statistical 
Office, the average investor implements an investment   strategy as follows: 
 
 Invest in index stocks which are included in analysts‟ recommendations 
 Invests  up to €20,000 (average portfolio value) 
 Does not diversify according to the beta coefficient but tend to concentrate on stocks which follow the 
General Stock Index very closely and are recommended. 
 He has short term investment horizon 
 
The above strategy abides by usual practice. It has the significant advantages that does not require very close 
monitoring or daily rebalancement and therefore avoids the huge costs associated with it. We proceeded by 
constructing   five portfolios according to the five levels of recommendations (strong buy, buy, hold, sell, strong sell) 
and we then measured the returns of these portfolios. Specifically, to construct the portfolios the following steps were 
followed. 
 
(i) We classified the 661 recommendations into the five categories as stated above. 
 
(ii)  We constructed the five portfolios 1-5, according to recommendations in the following way. 
 
 The sample recommendations were classified in daily chronological order during the period under 
examination. 
 In cases that different analysts recommended the same stock, the same day, but different target 
prices, we calculated the average target price price, which is the usual practice in the literature 
(Barber et.al (2001) and Jegadeesh et. al (2004)). 
 Each stock remained in the initial portfolio until it was reclassified to another category by analysts 
 
(iii) The returns of the five portfolios were measured for the following periods compared to the day that securities 
were included in the initial portfolio. 
 
 For the next day (t+1) 
 For next week (t+1, t+5) 
 For the previous day (t-1) and for the period (t-1,t) aiming to discover if the market has been 
informed 
 For the next month (t+1, t+21). 
 
To be able to get meaningful results, it is required that the structure of the portfolios remains relatively stable. 
To accomplish this, we change the structure of our portfolios only in the case that a recommendation changes from 
positive to negative. 
 
More specifically, in order to overcome the problem, we assumed (especially for the measurement of 
monthly returns), that the investors do not drop a stock when an inferior recommendation is published, except in the 
case that it changes from class 1-3 to class 4-5 and vice versa. 
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(iv) The return of each stock over a specific period (Rit) was calculated by he formula 
 
 
             (1) 
 
Where Pi,t-1 and Pit are the stock prices at the beginning and the end of the period respectively (dividends are 
not included). In cases that the number of stocks of a company changed within the period under examination, (i.e. 
split, reverse split), the prices   Pi,t-1 were modified according to the coefficient σ, given by the relationship below 
while the stock returns were calculated by formula (3) below. 
 
 
                    (2) 
 
 
Where N= no. of stocks before the change in the capital structure of the company, n= the no. of new stocks 
and Pn= the market price of the new stocks. 
 
 
 
          (3) 
 
(v) The portfolio return was calculated under the assumption of equally weighted stock returns 
 
 
 
             (4) 
 
 
(vi) From the respective portfolio returns we deducted the Athens Stock Index, over the corresponding period. 
 
(vii) The coefficient of systematic risk, b, for each of the 60 stocks in our sample was estimated over the period 
31/7/2002 up to 30/7/2004,497 observations in total, on the basis of the market model. The OLS method of estimation 
gave biased standard errors for the estimated coefficients due to the breaking down of the property of 
heteroskedasticity. Next, the model was tested for ARCH and GARCH effects and we finally ended up estimating by 
Maximun Likelihood the following model GARCH(1,1) for the 60 firms. 
 
Rit= ai + biRmt + ut                        (5) 
 
And ht = γ + δu
2
t-1 +κht-1 
 
Where Rmt is the market return at time period t and ai the estimated market model intercept. The variance of 
the residuals, ht,  is then regressed on the lagged value of the residual ut and the lagged value of itself. 
Each portfolio systematic risk was calculated by the the formula below. 
 
 
                 (6) 
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ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
Analyzing the results from Table 3, it is suggested clearly that investors‟ decisions should be affected by the 
published recommendations.  
 
 
Table 3: Raw Returns Of The Formed Portfolios 
 
 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 
t +1 0,63% 0,27% 0,17% -0,24% -0,91% 
t+1, t+5 0,97% 0,51% 0,71% 0,30% -1,3% 
t-1, t 0,08% 0,53% 0,6% 1,36% 0,77% 
   
 
More particularly, in the first day after the publication of a recommendation, the prices of the strongly 
suggested shares rise by 0,63% while they fall by 0,91% for those stocks which received the worst recommendations. 
Moreover, the relationship between the level of recommendation and the corresponding returns is almost linear. The 
above conclusions don‟t change when index-adjusted returns are considered. 
 
 
Table 4: Index Adjusted Returns Of The Formed Portfolios 
 
 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 
t +1 0,36% 0,06% 0,08% -0,91% -0,97% 
t+1, t+5 0,35% -0,12% 0,38% -1,3% -1,34% 
t-1, t -0,19% 0,17% 0,29% 0,77% 0,02% 
 
 
Looking at the previous day returns of the day that recommendations are published (t-1,t), it appears that 
portfolios 4 and 5 are superior. One could therefore argue that, analysts‟ recommendations influence investors so 
much that their preferences can be reversed within the day. It is also clear from our findings that recommendations do 
not become known before they are published. That is why there is a reversal in investors‟ preferences a day after 
recommendations are published. How long does the influence last for? From the tables3-5 it appears that the stocks 
with positive recommendations perform better compared to those stocks with negative recommendations,(0.73% 
against -0.50%). 
 
 
Table 5: Returns Of  The Positive And Negative Portfolios 
 
 Raw returns Index Adjusted Returns 
 Portfolios 1-3 Portfolios 4-5 Portfolios 1-3 Portfolios 4-5 
t +1 0,36% -0,58% 0,17% -0,94% 
t+1, t+5 0,73% -0,50% 0,20% -1,32% 
t-1, t 0,40% 1,07% 0,09% 0,40% 
t+1, t+21 3,10% 2,72% -0,04% 0,37% 
 
 
The difference among the two categories remains strong in terms of the modified returns as well (0.20% 
against -1.32%). In any case a month after, the recommendations influence has disappeared (3.1% against 2.72%). If 
the modified returns are taken into account the picture is reversed: The portfolio that includes the stocks with positive 
recommendations has a negative overall return 0.045% while the portfolio with the negatively recommended stocks 
has a positive return of 0.37%. This implies that over a holding period of one month, there is no benefit out of 
analysts‟ recommendations. On the contrary, these are useful for weekly stock transactions. If one though takes into 
account transaction costs, it severely limits or outweighs the benefits. Especially for private investors the transaction 
cost varies between 1.15-1.50%. The excess returns therefore that appear in tables 4 and 5 are not sufficient to cover 
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transaction costs. (This is in line with Barber et al (2001) for the NYSE and the AMEX). 
 
In theory, one could achieve a positive return buying stocks of portfolio 1 and selling stocks of portfolio 
5(short selling). In practice though this is not feasible, because short selling is not allowed with all stocks and 
furthermore the liquidity offered by the Athens Derivatives Exchange for such transactions, is limited. It must be 
pointed out that the calculation of the excess returns of the portfolios assumes implicitly, that the systematic risk of the 
formed portfolios is equal to 1. If this is not the case then the above prices have no meaning. From Τable 6, it appears 
that the systematic risk of the five portfolios is close to one, therefore false interpretation of the returns is ruled out. 
 
 
Table 6: Systematic Risk Estimations For The Formed Portfolios 
 
 beta 
1 1,06 
2 0,96 
3 0,93 
4 0,99 
5 0,97 
 
 
Like Barber et al (2001), we examined the influence of the degree of coverage of stocks by the analysts in the 
following manner. We constructed portfolios of „widespread coverage‟ comprised of stocks that have attracted the 
interest of the analysts (i.e. over half of the analysts recommended them a few times). We constructed portfolios of 
„neglected coverage‟ comprised of stocks that only one analyst has recommended once. We then compare the returns 
of the above portfolios. If the differences are substantial then it can be attributed to the amount of coverage received 
by the stocks. It appears from Table 7 that, when recommendations are positive, investors are not influenced by the 
amount of coverage received by the stocks. 
 
 
Table 7: Returns Of  The Higly Covered And Neglected Stocks-Criterion:  Number Of The Analysts Per Share 
 
 Highly Covered Neglected 
 Positive 
Recommendations 
Negative 
Recommendations 
Positive 
Recommendations 
Negative 
Recommendations 
t +1 0,46% 0,49% 0,38% -0,22% 
t+1, t+5 1,05% 1,05% 1,08% 0,82% 
t-1, t 0,39% 1,01% 0,12% 0,42% 
 
 
On the other hand, if recommendations are negative, they prefer those stocks with widespread coverage. 
Overall, the degree of coverage influence is practically negligible during the first day as well as the first week. The 
influence of the degree of coverage was reexamined taking as criterion this time the number of published 
recommendations per stock. 
 
 
Table 8: Returns Of The Higly Covered And Neglected Stocks 
Criterion; Number Of Published Recommendations Per Share 
 
 Highly Recommended Neglected 
 Positive 
Recommendations 
Negative 
Recommendations 
Positive 
Recommendations 
Negative 
Recommendations 
t +1 0,36% 0,1% 1,12% Zero observations 
t+1, t+5 1,3% 0,89% 1,13% Zero observations 
t-1, t 0,25% 0,48% 0,75% Zero observations 
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More specifically, a portfolio was constructed with the 10 stocks that gathered 50% of the total number of 
recommendations and another with stocks that had only one recommendation published. The results appear in Table 8 
and show that the number of recommendations has no influence whatsoever, on investors. More specifically, while 
during the first day after the publication of a recommendation, the neglected stocks have a superior performance, the 
profit is waved out within the first week. This can be interpreted by investors‟ behavior. They invest in neglected 
stocks after analysts recommendations but then liquidate, by the end of the first week in order to invest in well known 
stocks. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Greek stock exchange operates in the context of a globalized financial environment and however small an 
economy it represents, the ASE, is a microcosm of the conflict between market forces and   individual investor 
attitudes in the light of complete information sets, shaped through the provision of the financial press. In the present 
study it is shown that the financial press does affect the financial markets and may influence investor behavior in a 
number of ways. Investors for example learn to critically evaluate the firms in which they invest. Also they learn to 
invest in the best companies since analysts deal with the best of them, which accounts for the fact that the majority of 
analysts‟ recommendations are positive. 
 
 In the context of a chosen investment strategy, the Greek investor even though the first day after the 
recommendation seems to be able to make abnormal returns, by the end of the week and even so more, by the end of 
the 21-day period under consideration, finds his excess return swept away by the substantial transaction costs 
involved. Our results support the overall conclusion that analysts‟ recommendations do not offer net excess returns to 
private investors with reference to the Athens Stock Exchange. It adds another case in support of the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
A useful extension of this study would be to look at the effect that changes in analysts‟ recommendations 
might have on investors‟ returns. Furthermore, one could look more closely at the formation of the target price by the 
analysts. It would be interesting to assess whether the evaluation methods used have any impact on target price 
formation and therefore category or change of recommendation.  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. The authors would like to express their gratitude to P.Kiousoglou for processing the bulk of the data work.  
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